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NOTES
EMPLOYER REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSES
No-strike clauses in which unions promise not to strike or engage in
work stoppages appeared in more than 94 per cent of all collective bargain-
ing agreements in 1960.1 The no-strike clause is of manifest importance
to the employer, for it is obtained as its sole assurance that business
operations will continue uninterrupted by inevitable labor-management
disagreements. It has long been thought that specific enforcement was
the only satisfactory employer remedy for breach of a no-strike clause,'
but a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Sinclair Refin-
ing Co. v. Atkinson,3 has held that federal courts may not issue injunc-
tions for breach of a no-strike clause and has cast grave doubt upon the
appropriateness of the injunctive remedy in state forums as well. Be-
cause of the widespread use and importance of the no-strike clause, and
because Sinclair has limited the possible remedies available for its viola-
tion, it is of value to collect and review the remedies presently available to
an employer. The remedies reviewed in this note are the injunction,
rescission of the collective bargaining agreement, award of damages, dis-
charge and other discipline, and subcontracting.4
I. INJUNCTION
Federal Court Injunction
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley) permits parties to collective bargaining agreements in "an in-
dustry affecting commerce" to seek redress in federal courts for viola-
tions of the agreement,' but the act does not indicate what remedies are
1. LAB. REL. REP. EXPEDITOR 94 (1960).
2. See, e.g., Stewart, No Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MIcH. L. Rav.
673, 674-75 (1961):
The discharge of strike leaders does not end the strike; at best it stops
future efforts. A damage action, tried years later to the vagaries of a jury,
is small recompense to the employer denied business because he can't deliver.
Equitable relief is not only the most appropriate remedy, but also the only
effective one.
See also Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievaiwe Arbitration, 30 RocKY MT.
L. REv. 247, 255 (1958).
3. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
4. Although not technically a legal remedy or a remedy generally agreed upon in
a labor contract, subcontracting may be a practical remedy. Its possible utility to em-
ployers hampered by a strike is sufficient to warrant a treatment of the legal problems
engendered by its use.
5. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
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available in such suits. This grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts,
without specification of remedy, created difficult problems in regard to
injunctions as possible remedies for strikes or work stoppages violating
a no-strike clause because Section 4 of the earlier-enacted Norris-
LaGuardia Act6 deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunc-
tions in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes. In Sinclair the
Supreme Court resolved the immediate problem of the apparent conflict
between the two acts by holding that Norris-LaGuardia deprives federal
courts of jurisdiction to grant an injunction in section 301 suits prohibit-
ing strikes in violation of a no-strike clause. The court reviewed the
language and legislative history of Taft-Hartley and found no indication
that section 301 had been intended to repeal any part of Norris-LaGuardia.
The court also rejected policy arguments urged by the employer that fed-
eral labor policy favors arbitration so strongly that an injunction against
peaceful strikes should be available to make arbitration effective.7 But
while the Court in Sinclair answered a basic question, it created others
equally as difficult.
State Court Injunction
The most obvious problem created is the availability of injunctive
relief in state courts for union violations of a no-strike clause. Section 4
of Norris-LaGuardia expressly applies only to federal courts and does not
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.
6. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). Section 4, in part, reads:
No Court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or grow-
ing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the
following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment ....
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any
labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any method
not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of
their interests in a labor dispute. . . .
7. There has been a great deal of comment on the Sinclair case. See, e.g., Aaron,
Strikes in Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Some Unanswered Qftestions,
63 COLUm. L. RFv. 1027 (1963) ; Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the
Political Process: A Comment on Sinwlair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547 (1963);
Comment, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 626; 48 A.B.A.J. 62 (1962); 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
520 (1962); 76 HARv. L. REv. 205 (1962); 47 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1963); 16 VAND.
L. REv. 245 (1962).
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on its face deprive state courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions.8 More-
over, under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, state courts have con-
current jurisdiction with federal courts in suits for violation of contract
between an employer and a labor organization.9 The Supreme Court has
held in Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co."° that in cases
brought in state courts under section 301, those courts must, in order to
achieve uniformity in the disposition of section 301 cases, apply federal
labor law. The question thus is whether state remedial law, which may
include the injunction, is inconsistent with substantive federal labor law.
Ultimately the answer will be supplied by the circuit courts through
unanimity of decision, or the Supreme Court, and will depend on whether
or not it is found that the pervading policy of section 301 of Taft-
Hartley and previous Supreme Court decisions implementing that sec-
tion" require restricting state court remedies so as to allow an employer
in a state court only those forms of relief which are available in federal
courts. In order to decide this question the federal judiciary will be
forced to choose between two contradictory, but equally convincing
arguments.
The argument against allowing state courts to issue injunctions re-
straining contract violations has been cogently stated by Professor Ben-
jamin Aaron. 2 He asserts that the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
Sinclair case leads to the conclusion that state courts should not be allowed
to grant injunctions in section 301 cases. This conclusion is drawn prin-
cipally from the belief that an injunctive remedy against strikes is of such
a different character from other remedies that "it must be considered a
separate right rather than merely an alternate form of relief." 3 If an
injunction is a "right," and state courts are allowed to grant them while
federal courts may not, the discrepancy between the federal and state
8. "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute. . . ." 46 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958) (emphasis added.)
"The term 'court of the United States' means any court of the United States
whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred or defined or limited by Act of Con-
gress, including the courts of the District of Columbia." 46 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C.
§ 113(d) (1958).
9. "Suits for violation of contracts . . . inay be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties. . . ." 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958) (emphasis added.) See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502 (1962).
10. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
11. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ;
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
12. Aaron, supra note 7, at 1035.
13. Ibid.
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practice would preclude the development of a uniform federal labor law
for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements-a result which
the Supreme Court has held to be required by section 301." 4
The argument in favor of allowing state court injunctions is equally
persuasive. Since there is nothing in section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia
which prevents state court injunctions, section 301 of Taft-Hartley must
provide the proscription. But it is relatively clear that nothing in the
legislative history or actual wording of section 301 deprives state courts
of the right to grant injunctions in cases involving labor disputes." In
fact, it would seem quite unreasonable to construe section 301, a provi-
sion passed to strengthen the enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments, to deprive employers of effective remedies which they enjoyed
prior to its enactment." The leading state court case decided prior to
Sinclair adopted this argument," and in the only state court case since
Sinclair to date, a New York Supreme Court declared that its action in
granting an injunction against a union to prevent further breaches of a
no-strike clause was not proscribed by the holding of Sinclair."8
The problem of the state court injunction in section 301 cases may
be rendered moot by the possibility of removal of such cases to federal
courts should those courts allow removal, dismiss because of Sinclair and
14. Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
15. State courts have uniformly held that they possess the power to issue such
injunctions. Foley Constr. Co. v. Truck Drivers Local 100, 47 L.R.R.M. 2156 (Ohio
C.P. 1960); McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d
45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); Philadelphia M.T. Ass'n
v. International Longshoremen's Local 1291, 382 Pa. 326, 115 A.2d 733 (1955). See
also, McClean Distr. Co. v. Brewery & Beverage Drivers Local 993, 254 Minn. 204,
94 N.W.2d 514 (1959).
16. See Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195 (1962).
17. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d 45,
315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) (pre-Sinclair). A suit was
brought in a state court under section 301. It was held that a state court was not pre-
cluded from issuing an injunction in section 301 cases merely because a federal court
might not have jurisdiction to grant the same relief. The court was of the opinion that
Congress had not, in passing Taft-Hartley, withheld equitable remedies available in the
states, and the policy behind section 301 was to correct inequities in labor laws which
were thought to favor unions. Hence, to deny employers injunctive relief would iron-
ically place them in a worse position than they had been in before passage of the act.
18. C. D. Perry & Sons v. Robilotto, 39 Misc.2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup.
Ct. 1963). The court in granting a temporary injunction first held that a strike in vio-
lation of a no-strike clause was not a "labor dispute" within the state anti-injunction
statute, and consequently, there was no state prohibition against issuing an injunction
in such a case. The court said that Siclair did not hold that the federal prohibition
against injunctions applied to state courts; and, even if state courts were required to
follow federal labor law policy under section 301, Sinclair was not a policy determina-
tion, but rather a statutory construction. Because that is precisely the question to be
explored, this decision is obviously not conclusive.
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then deny a motion to remand. If a case is within the original jurisdic-
tion of the federal district court, as are suits for an alleged violation of
a collective bargaining agreement by virtue of section 301, Section 1441
(a) of the Judicial Code permits the defendant or defendants to remove
the case from the state court to the federal district court. 9 Obviously,
because of the Sinclair decision and at least until its applicability to state
court injunctive powers is resolved, a union as defendant in a state court
injunction suit for violation of a no-strike clause would petition for
removal to the federal court under section 1441 (a). Whether removal
should be allowed depends ultimately upon the meaning given the term
"jurisdiction" within section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia, viz., whether it
means "lack of authority to take cognizance of the suit or lack of au-
thority to act after taking cognizance of the suit."2  Some courts have
held in relevant pre-Sinclair decisions that the language of section 4 means
a federal court cannot even take cognizance of the claim for injunctive
relief, and hence removal is not allowable ;21 others have held that regard-
less of how a federal court finally disposes of the action, Norris-
LaGuardia does not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to take cog-
nizance of cases in which injunctive relief is sought,22 nor to grant other
than injunctive relief. 3
A few federal courts in pre-Sinclair decisions distinguished between
suits in which an injunction was the only remedy sought and suits in
which both an injunction and damages were sought. 4 In National Dairy
Products Corp. v. Heffernatw' the court stated that while it would have
no jurisdiction to hear an employer action seeking only an injunction, the
court would nevertheless have original jurisdiction of a suit seeking both
an injunction and damages.2" The complaint was dismissed as to injunc-
tive relief "for lack of jurisdiction, but not on the merits,"27 and re-
manded to the state court; the suit for damages was not dismissed. Pro-
fessor Aaron states that a majority of relevant cases in an informally
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1958).
20. National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Heffernan, 195 F. Supp. 153, 155 (E.D.N.Y.
1961). Cf. Aaron, supra note 7, at 1042.
21. See, e.g., Berrios v. Bull Insular Line, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 858 (D.P.R. 1953).
22. See, e.g., Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Trade
Council, 93 F. Supp. 217 (D. Me. 1950).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) permits unrequested relief:
"Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
24. For an extended discussion of the possible complexities involved in a suit for
both damages and injunction, see Aaron, supra note 7, at 1046-51.
25. 195 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
26. Id. at 156.
27. Ibid.
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conducted survey of federal court practice suggest that federal courts
have permitted removal of the damage claim while remanding the request
for injunctive relief to the state court.28
In those federal courts which permit removal, the question remains
whether the court will dispose of the suit on its merits. Because of
Norris-LaGuardia and the Sinclair decision a disposition on the merits
would constitute a dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief through
a lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, whether or not the court disposes of
the case on the merits (i.e., dismisses for lack of jurisdiction), it must
also decide whether or not to remand the case to the state court. The
only relevant federal cases since Sinclair have allowed removal and de-
nied remand of the claim for injunctive relief, even though it was joined
with claims for other relief, and thereby foreclosed any possibility of a
state court injunction.2" The denial of the motion for remand in these
cases was based upon a finding that federal labor law prohibits state court
injunctions; but neither case adequately discussed the complex problems
involved in such a decision.3" Nevertheless, the cases may represent the
beginning of a trend in the federal courts to allow removal, deny remand
and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction-all on the grounds of "federal labor
policy." This practice enables the federal courts to reach the result they
feel is required without discussing and resolving all the procedural and
substantive complexities. Because of the great confusion in this area,
and the importance of the question presented, it is possible that the Su-
preme Court will decide the matter in the very near future.
Arbitrator's Award
An arbitrator's cease and desist order is a third possible source of
injunctive relief for an employer seeking to enjoin a union's breach of a
no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement. In Ruppert v. Egel-
hofer3' the New York Court of Appeals held that when a union violates
a no-strike clause, no ground exists for invalidating an arbitrator's cease
and desist order if it is found that the particular bargaining agreement
28. Aaron, supra note 7, at 1051-52.
29. Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers Union, 54 L.R.R.M. 2317 (E.D.N.Y.
1963) ; Lott, Inc. v. Hoisting Engineers, 54 L.R.R.M. 2402 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
30. In Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers Union, supra note 29, remand was
denied because "federal" law is to be applied "with uniform force in all the courts of
the land." 54 L.R.R.M. at 2320. But the court failed to specify which federal law pro-
hibits state court injunctions. In Lott, Inc. v. Hoisting Engineers, supra note 29, remand
was denied on the broad ground of required uniformity.
31. 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958).
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contemplated the inclusion of that order in an arbitrator's award.3 2 Be-
cause federal courts liberally construe arbitration clauses and the scope
of an arbitrator's authority under collective bargaining agreements,"3 it
is possible that federal courts too would be willing to enforce an arbi-
trator's cease and desist order. Indeed one federal case, where the court
reasoned in the same fashion as the New York court in Ruppert, supports
this view: because the parties there had by their collective bargaining
agreement authorized the arbitrator to grant a cease and desist order,
Norris-LaGuardia did not preclude a federal court from enforcing the
arbitrator's order that the union cease work stoppages in violation of
their contract." However, both of the above decisions are pre-Sinclair,
and whether they declare the present status of federal and state court en-
forcement of arbitrator cease and desist orders is uncertain since such
enforcement arguably is tantamount to issuing an injunction. It could
be maintained that in such a situation a court does not issue an injunction
in the traditional sense, but merely confirms an award of the arbitrator
by ordering compliance with it. The distinction is admittedly tenuous,
but could arguably serve as the basis for supporting the arbitrator's
award. Moreover, a grant of the injunctive power to arbitrators by the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement is voluntary, and presumably
was bargained for and desired by them. " There would be obvious in-
equity in permitting a union to escape its voluntary agreements, though it
must be recognized that the Court in Sinclair was not persuaded by that
position.
But there are nevertheless two factors which militate against the
conclusion that Sinclair would proscribe the judicial enforcement of arbi-
32. 3 N.Y.2d at 581-82, 148 N.E.2d at 131 (1958). Accord, Wholesale Laundry
Bd. of Trade v. Tarualla, 103 N.Y.S.2d 23, (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Brynmore Press, Inc.,
7 Lab. Arb. 648 (1947) (Harry H. Rains).
33. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960) ; United Steelvorkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ;
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). In these three de-
cisions, often referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court held in
essence that in disputed cases concerning the coverage of the arbitration clause, the
function of the court is merely to determine whether the collective bargaining agree-
ment contemplated that the arbitration clause was to cover the grievance or dispute in
question. Once coverage is established, the interpretation of the agreement is for the
arbitrator and not the court. Any doubt about coverage of a particular dispute should
be resolved in favor of coverage. See also, Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American
Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 255 (1962).
34. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 49 L.R.R.M.
2941 (E.D. La. 1962).
35. Generally, collective bargaining agreements do not expressly grant or withhold
arbitrator injunctive power. Rather, to decide if such power has been impliedly con-
ferred, courts must look to the intent of the parties to see what remedies they neces-
sarily contemplated could be granted by the arbitrator. Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d
576, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958). See also Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1055, 1057 (1960).
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trator injunctive awards. First, there is, as has been seen, a strong
federal labor policy which favors the maintenance of an effective arbi-
tration process, 8 and the injunction is uncontrovertably the most speedy
and flexible arbitrator power. Second, and perhaps most important,
judicial enforcement of arbitrator cease and desist orders would permit
federal and state courts to uniformly deny injunctions for violations of
a no.-strike clause, yet the severity of such a denial would be mitigated
by permitting unions and employers to contractually empower a mutually
agreed upon third party, the arbitrator, to enjoin such conduct.
II. RESCISSION, DAMAGES, DISCHARGE AND OTHER DISCIPLINE,
AND SUBCONTRACTING
Introduction: Arbitrators and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
The employer remedies of rescission, damages, discharge and other
discipline, and subcontracting are frequently modified by the collective
bargaining agreement. This modification is accomplished either by in-
cluding the remedy within the scope of the arbitrator's authority to award,
as is sometimes the case with damages, or by being expressly or impliedly
within the arbitrator's authority to review, e.g., as a "dispute" which the
agreement authorizes the arbitrator to consider. In the latter case the
arbitrator determines, if permitted by the contract, the rights of the parties
under the contract. In the light of such a determination he will either
annul, alter or confirm the employer's attempted rescission or disciplinary
action. Because there are cases in which an arbitrator will in effect de-
termine the remedy available to the employer, it is necessary to mention
the nature of arbitrator treatment of the collective bargaining agreement."
Arbitrator interpretive treatment of collective bargaining agreements
ranges over a continuum extending from very loose or liberal interpreta-
tion, in which the agreement is treated as a vital instrument or constitu-
tion and the arbitrator as its physician,"8 to absolute literalness of in-
terpretation where the arbitrator is a most stern and strict judge." Ob-
viously then, when an employer's remedy is subject to an arbitrator's de-
termination, it is impossible to predict the result unless a particular agree-
ment and the specific arbitrator's style of arbitration are considered to-
gether. These factors must be kept in mind when considering the arbi-
trator's decisions cited below. At most, because some arbitrators view
36. See note 33 supra.
37. For a recent treatment of this subject see Fuller, Collective Bargaining and
the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. Rnv. 3.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id at 3.
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the awards of others with the respect often accorded precedent, a decision
may reflect the beginnings of vaguely articulated standards; at the least,
since some arbitrators view each collective bargaining agreement and its
setting as unique, the decisions will indicate merely what these arbitrators
have found significant in the determination of a particular claim.
Rescission
A collective bargaining agreement is a contract, and although it has
unique characteristics which render it a specialized form of contract, con-
tract law in regard to rescission and breach applies to it.4" In this regard
it has been held that the violation of a noq-strike clause in a collective bar-
gaining agreement is a material breach which will justify rescission of the
contract by an employer.4 ' However, if under the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement the existence or non-existence of a condition prece-
dent to the employer's right to rescind is subject to arbitration, then a
favorable decision by an arbitrator will become a necessary intermediate
step before the employer may rescind.
For example, if there is a question as to whether or not the union
has actually breached a no-strike clause, as might be the case when the
strike was a "wildcat" strike which the union in fact attempted to dis-
courage, and the arbitration clause in the agreement is sufficiently broad,
a court would find that union responsibility for the strike was an arbi-
trable question under the contract. Since the contract is between em-
ployer and union, rather than between employer and individual employees,
the union cannot be said to have refused to perform it in some material
respect unless union responsibility for or condonation of the strike is
shown. The finding of a union breach in any particular case depends,
of course, upon the facts, the contract provisions which relate to union
responsibility for the acts of its members and union responsibility to pre-
serve the contract. If the question of union responsibility for the breach
40. United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 981, rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1956); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aero-
nautical Lodge 751, IAM, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821 (1951);
Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United Biscuit Co. v.
NLRB, 128 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1942). See also Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906, 911
(2d Cir. 1952), quoting with approval Mobley v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 295 U.S. 632, 638
(1935).
41. United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, supra note 40; Boeing Airplane Co. v.
Aeronautical Lodge 751, IAM, supra note 40. For a critical view of this position see
Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 1,
18-19 (1958). Furthermore, under these circumstances an employer need not give notice
of termination under section 8(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat.
140, (1947) 29 U.S.C. § 158, (1958). United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338
(D.C. Cir. 1955).
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of a no-strike clause is arbitrated and the union found responsible, the
employer will be able to rescind the contract. On the other hand, if the
union is found not responsible, the employer will be unable to rescind un-
less a court should thereafter vacate the arbitrator's award.
When there is a breach material enough for the employer to rescind
the contract if it wishes, such as a union's breach of a no-strike clause,
the employer may either rescind, or continue the contract and sue for the
damages caused by its breach." If the employer elects to rescind the
agreement it will not be allowed to recover damages for the breach which
induced it to rescind.4" The remedies are mutually exclusive. Conse-
quently, an employer who finds itself in a position to rescind must con-
sider carefully whether or not it would be of more value to it to con-
tinue the contract and sue for damages. Rescission will leave it with-
out a labor contract. In that case a new contract would have to be
negotiated, with all the difficulties that portends. On the other hand, the
employer must recognize that damages may be difficult to prove. Nu-
merous considerations must enter the employer's judgment, but little that
is both general and concrete can be said. The particular facts and cir-
cumstances of each specific case must be weighed in relation to the pos-
sible benefit to be gained from the damages obtainable before any deci-
sion can be made.
If the employer elects to rescind the contract it is necessary that it
do so completely, for failure may result in a determination that there was
no rescission.44 Employer activity after the alleged breach in pursuance
of the allegedly repudiated contract, e.g., deduction of union dues and
processing and adjusting pending grievances under the contract grievance
procedure, may lead to an arbitrator or judicial determination that the
employer has waived the violation for purposes of rescission.4"
Damages
As seen above damages are an available remedy for a union's breach
of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement.46 Furthermore,
42. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Lodge 751, IAM, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.
1951), affirming 91 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Wash. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821
(1951).
43. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Lodge 751, IAM, supra note 42.
44. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
45. Local 748, IUE v. Jefferson City Cabinet Co., 315 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1963).
In Brynmore Press, Inc., 7 Lab. Arb. 648 (1947) (Harry H. Rains), an arbitrator
held that by proceeding to arbitration the employer had waived his right to rescind.
46. See Annot., 7 L. Ed.2d 959, 985 (1962); Annot., 99 L. Ed. 529, 535, 543
(1955); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 614, 616 (1951). 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1958) makes unions suable as entities:
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
NOTES
the fact that such a violation of contract may also constitute an unfair
labor practice does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction under section
301 of Taft-Hartley to hear the case." But of paramount importance
in damage suits for violation of no-strike clauses are those contract pro-
visions which define the area and depth of arbitration. Recourse must
always be had to such provisions to determine whether the employer has
obligated itself to have its damage claims heard by the arbitrator rather
than the courts, the authority of the arbitrator to award damages and any
other indication in the contract that might lead a court to conclude that
the employer has totally relinquished its right to bring a damage suit for
violation of contract or, at least, has forfeited the right until the arbi-
tration process has been exhausted.
In Drake Bakeries v. Local .5o, American Bakery Workers8 the
union requested a stay of the employer's damage suit for breach of a no-
strike agreement on the ground that its claim was an arbitrable matter
under the contract. Relying heavily on the fact that the contract con-
tained a very broad arbitration clause which did not expressly exclude
breaches of the no-strike provision, the court held that the parties in-
tended such a claim to be arbitrable.49 When the Drake Bakeries' ap-
proach of letting the specific provisions of each arbitration clause con-
trol the issue of arbitrability is read in conjunction with the Supreme
Court's holdings in the Steelworkers Trilogy and reiterations of the prin-
ciples stated there,' it appears that unless the collective bargaining agree-
ment expressly or by manifest implication excludes the possibility that the
commerce as defined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any
such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money
judgment against a labor organization in the district court of the United States
shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its
assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his
assets.
47. United Steelworkers v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1959);
Textile Workers Union v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951); Ludlow
Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 108 F. Supp. 45 (D. Del. 1952).
48. 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
49. The court rejected the employer's argument "that an alleged strike, automatic-
ally and regardless of the circumstances, is such a breach or repudiation of the arbi-
tration clause by the union that the company is excused from arbitrating, upon theories
of waiver, estoppel, or otherwise." Id. at 262. See, however, Local 721, United Pack-
inghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 119 N.W.2d 141 (Iowa 1963), rev'd. 32
U.S. Law Week 4202 (1964), where a state court purporting to apply federal law
held that violation of a no-strike clause by a union constitutes a waiver of the union's
right to demand arbitration pursuant to the contract.
50. See, e.g., Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370
U.S. 255 (1962); United Cement Workers Int'l v. Celotex Corp., 205 F. Supp. 957
(E.D. Pa. 1962); Freight Drivers, Teamsters Union v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc.,
195 F. Supp. 180 (D. Mass. 1961).
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question of damages shall be subject to arbitration in the event of a con-
tract violation, the question will be deemed arbitrable.5 Thus, if there
is any doubt as to the interpretation of the contract in regard to the arbi-
rator's authority to hear a damage claim, a court is likely to grant at the
union's request a stay of the damage suit pending arbitration,2 unless the
arbitration clause is narrowly drawn or some union activity makes it
reasonable or equitable to deny it a stay."
This does not mean that should a court decide that an employer's
damage claim for a union's violation of contract is within the arbitration
clause, for example as a dispute over the meaning of the contract, the
employer will in all cases be unable to bring suit for damages. In many
instances it means only that because the union has requested a stay of the
action until arbitration procedures have been followed, the employer must
withhold the suit until that process is completed as stipulated by the agree-
ment. Of course, if it is found that the arbitrator has authority to award
damages, the employer will not be permitted to bring suit; in that case
the employer's sole recourse to the judiciary is through proceedings to
modify, vacate or enforce the arbitration award.
If the action for damages is brought in a state court, as is permis-
sible since section 301 of Taft-Hartley does not deprive state courts
of jurisdiction, and the problem of the arbitrative nature of the question
of damages is resolved in favor of its exclusion from the arbitration
clause of the contract, the state court must nevertheless apply federal
labor law."'
Measure of Damages
The general formula for measurement of damages resulting from
the violation of a collective bargaining agreement allows recovery for all
expenses and losses occasioned by the violation. Obviously there are a
great many difficulties in determining and subsequently proving the
monetary effect of a strike upon an employer. Arbitrators have held
51. "In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance
from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the
claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where . . . the exclusion clause is
vague and the arbitration clause quite broad." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960).
52. See, e.g., Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370
U.S. 255 (1962).
53. See, e.g., Simonds Const. Co. v. Local 1330, International Hod Carriers, 315
F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1963), where the union was held not entitled to a stay pending
arbitration of an employer's action under section 301 for damages for breach of a no-
strike agreement where the union failed to appeal the initial denial of stay for one
year after the employer had filed suit.
54. Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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that damages will be awarded for loss of net profit,55 constant and in-
creased overhead costs" (which may possibly include salaries of office
and managerial staff, depreciation of fixed assets, utilities, insurance,
taxes, cost of fringe benefits and increased storage and equipment costs57)
and loss of good will. 8  Courts have allowed in addition to the above
items recovery for increased direct labor costs, " and losses resulting from
specific inefficient operation occasioned by the strike."0 Adjustments
will be made, as circumstances of the particular case may dictate, for
sales which were postponed rather than lost because of the strike.61
Furthermore, an arbitrator has found that the employer has a duty to
mitigate those damages occasioned by the strike in violation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, and a failure to do so will result in reduc-
tion of the claim.62 Finally, there are two situations sometimes present
when strikes in violation of contract occur which have affected arbitrator
awards. First, if the union believes in good faith that under the terms
of the contract it has a right to strike-that is, that the no-strike clause is
a limited one which does not proscribe their particular contemplated ac-
tivity-then it may be found that the union action was justifiable as a
reasonable interpretation or misinterpretation of the agreement.63 Such
a finding may reduce an otherwise proper award even though damages
are measured solely by the employer's loss, particularly where evidence
of damage is not strong. Second, if the employer engaged in action
which can be shown to have provoked the strike in violation of contract,
it may be held to a degree responsible for the strike and its damages
55. Regent Quality Furniture, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 553 (1959) (Burton B. Turkus) ;
Canadian General Elec. Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 925 (1952) (Bora Laskin, chairman); Bryn-
more Press, Inc., 7 Lab. Arb. 648 (1947) (Harry H. Rains) (award for "direct dam-
ages").
56. Ibid. See also Oregonian Publishing Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 574 (1959) (Paul L.
Kleinsorge).
57. Canadian General Elec. Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 925 (1952) (Bora Laskin, chair-
man).
58. Oregonian Publishing Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 574 (1959) (Paul L. Kleinsorge);
Brynmore Press, Inc., 7 Lab. Arb. 648 (1947) (Harry H. Rains).
59. International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Bay City Erection Co., 300 F.2d
270 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Gage Plumbing Supply Co. v. Hod Carriers, 202 Cal. App.2d 197,
20 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1962).
60. International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Bay City Erection Co., supra note
59.
61. Regent Quality Furniture, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 553 (1959) (Burton B. Turkus).
62. Brynmore Press, Inc., 7 Lab. Arb. 648, 656-57 (1947) (Harry H. Rains).
63. See International Harvester Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 302 (1950) (Ralph T. Seward)
(suspension of union officials unjustified where officials had good reason to believe
that stoppage was permissible). Although this is a discipline rather than a damage
case, there is, ceteris paribus, no reason to suppose that the reasoning of the award
would not apply equally to damage cases.
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reduced accordingly."'
In United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co.65 it was held that
punitive damages are not a permissible award in section 301 actions
brought in a federal court. It is likely that state courts will similarly
not be able to award punitive damages since, according to Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,66 state courts are required to apply
federal labor law in damage suits brought in state courts for section 301
violations of a collective bargaining agreement.67 Because punitive dam-
ages are thus not a permissible award in contract actions,6" it would be
thought that a state court to grant such damages would have to do so
pursuant either to statutory permission or under a tort theory of concerted
labor action. But the tort theory of conspiracy through concerted activity
by employees and that of malicious and wrongful interference with busi-
ness have been abolished as a federal cause of action both by a statute
which creates a right to concerted activity by employees, and by the
policy underlying the statute.6" A state court award of punitive damages
by any authority, therefore, would place that tribunal's determination
squarely in opposition to the federal practice and policy. The possibility
that states might even under these restrictions grant remedies beyond
those available in federal courts in section 301 actions does not appear to
be applicable in the case of punitive damages; such damages are not
a matter of remedial right, and are not part of the damage remedy the
employer seeks in the sense that they are not intended to make it
whole. It should finally be noted that arbitrators may not award puni-
64. Speer Carbon Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 247 (1951) (Jacob J. Blair); cf. Xnight
Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140 (1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 927 (1957), rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
65. 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962).
66. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
67. At least one commentator thinks that state courts would follow a rule similar
to that of federal courts. Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L. RIv,
1199, 1221 (1962).
68. 5 CoRmiN, CONTRACrS § 1077 (1951).
69. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other material aid or protection." 49 Stat. 452 § 7 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
No court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provi-
sions of such sections; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in such
sections. 47 Stat. 70, § 1 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). [The employee]
. , . shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers . . .
in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other material
aid or protection. . . . 47 Stat. 70, § 2 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
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tive damages."0
The Labor Management Relations Act establishes unions as entities
for the purpose of suit,"' but also provides that damages may not be ob-
tained both from a defendant union and its individual employee-
members.72 Through a tort theory of interference with business it
has been held that an employer may recover damages from individual
strikers who participate in a wildcat strike in breach of contract.7" This
holding has been criticized, and whether it represents a correct statement
of the law is subject to doubt."4 Moreover, the employer has little to gain
from damage suits against individual employees."5 It is quite likely that
the individuals sued would be unable to satisfy a judgment against them,
70. This is true even though the arbitrator is given authority by the contract.
The parties to labor controversies have enough devices for making one another
"smart" without this Court putting its stamp of approval on another. I can
conceive of nothing more disruptive of congenial labor relations than arming
employee, union and management with the potential for "smarting" one another
with exemplary damages. Even without the punitive element, a damage action
has an unfavorable effect on the climate of labor relations.
UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 653 (1962).
71. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1958).
72. Ibid. See also Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249 (1962): "The
national labor policy requires and we hold that when a union is liable for damages for
violation of the no-strike clause, its officers and members are not liable for these
damages."
73. Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 949 (1958). In this case plaintiff based its claim for damages on three sep-
arate theories. The first was violation of a duty allegedly imposed on defendant by the
Railway Labor Act to settle disputes without interrupting commerce. See 48 Stat. 1187
(1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958). The second theory was wrongful interference with
plaintiff's contractual right to have disputes settled according to the procedures of the
Railway Labor Act. The third theory was tortious interference with plaintiff's business.
The trial court dismissed all three. The circuit court rejected the first theory, reserved
judgment on the second pending the trial court's determination of the merits of such a
claim under state law, and reversed as to the third, saying "a willful interference with
appellant's business without the justification normally flowing from a lawful strike is
actionable and warrants a judgment for damages in Alabama." Louisville & Nashville
Ry. v. Brown, supra at 156.
74. In Givens, Responsibility of Individual Employees for Breaches of No-Strike
Clause, 14 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 595 (1961), the following criticisms are made:
(1) The thirteenth amendment prohibits imposing damages upon an individual employee
for striking in concert with his fellow employees; (2) although striking in breach of
contract is not protected for purposes of the employer's right to discharge, the individ-
ual striker is protected from damage suits because of the drastic consequences a suc-
cessful damage suit would have upon him; (3) in this typical collective agreement,
the promise not to strike runs from the union to the employer, not from the individual
employee to the employer. In Comment, 59 CoLUit. L. Rxv. 177 (1959), additional
criticisms are offered as to the decision in the Browh case. It further contends that
the case wrongly interpreted state law as allowing such a tort action, that section 6 of
Norris-LaGuardia, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1958), prohibited such a hold-
ing in this case and that policy considerations dictate a different result.
75. If damages are recoverable from individual wildcat strikers, the measure of
such damages would depend on the theory under which recovery was allowed as well
as the factors mentioned above which determine the amount and measure of damages.
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except in those cases when the strike caused very little recoverable loss.
Rather than serving as a means of compensation for employer loss, this
remedy would result, except in the very unusual case, only in antagoniz-
ing the employees and may ultimately lead to a greater disruption in in-
dustrial relations than was occasioned by the dispute which precipitated
the initial violation.
Discipline and Discharge
As with its damage remedy, it is possible that the employer may
have limited its right to discipline by the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. If the arbitration clause is broad, 6 the holdings in the
Steelworkers Trilogy would apply so that doubts as to the extent of the
agreement's arbitration clause would be resolved in favor of coverageY
The matter depends entirely on court construction of the contract, and
no court will do more than determine whether the action in question was
covered by the arbitration agreement." In cases of inclusion, discharge
and other disciplinary action which the employer may have taken against
employees because of participation in a strike which violated the contract,
will be subject to enforced arbitration. Of course, if the employer has
expressly reserved without restriction its right to discipline and dis-
charge, or if the court should interpret the contract as not including em-
ployer disciplinary action within the scope of the arbitration clause, then
such action will be subject only to the employer unfair labor practice
proscriptions of the National Labor Relations Act.
If the employer's disciplinary action is determined to be an arbitrable
matter then, on arbitrator review of the action in light of the contract
terms, the employer may be required to justify the kind and severity of
the disciplinary action taken."9 As would be expected, justification of
76. E.g., "The parties agree that they will promptly attempt to adjust all com-
plaints, disputes or grievances arising between them involving questions of interpreta-
tion or application of any clause or matter covered by this contract or any act or con-
duct or relation between the parties hereto, directly or indirectly." Quoted in Drake
Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 255, 257 (1962).
77. Jefferson City Cabinet Co. v. IUE, Local 748, 313 F.2d 231 (6th Cir.) cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 936 (1963). In this case the court relied upon Drake Bakeries in
holding that a union did not waive its right to demand arbitration of discharges by
engaging in a strike in violation of the contract. See note 49 supra.
78. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960)
"The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all
questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed
by the contract."
79. In the following arbitration cases involving no-strike clauses, employer action
was held to be either justified or too severe: Pittsburgh Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 598
(1960) (Harry H. Platt) (six month suspension too severe) ; Eljer Co. Brass Div.,
34 Lab. Arb. 741 (1960) (Wayne T. Geissinger) (discharge justified) ; Alside, Inc.,
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that discipline used in each particular case depends in large measure upon
the employee's role in the strike. In those cases which have dealt spe-
cifically with strikes in violation of a no-strike clause, employees have
been classified by arbitrators according to the facts in each case as
(1) instigators and leaders, i.e., those fully aware of the nature of their
action who did all in their power to instigate and sustain the strike;
(2) direct followers, or those willing to strike and desirous of helping
the strike along; and (3) bystanders, or those carried along by group
pressure who have little realization of the significance of events."s Need-
less to say, the penalty exacted by the employer and sanctioned by the
arbitrator should be commensurate with the role played by the individual
in the strike.8 If, for example, the instigators and leaders of a strike are
punished by discharge, an arbitrator is likely to find that the same penalty
applied to direct followers is too severe." Moreover, the responsibility
for the origin of the strike in violation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment will be a factor in the arbitrator's consideration of the discipline
imposed by the employer. If the union has through a good faith belief
in the propriety of its action encouraged or permitted a strike, perhaps
because contract ambiguities have obfuscated the extent of the no-strike
clause, the arbitrator is likely to make a reduction in any discipline im-
posed. 3 Since all collective bargaining agreements do not contain a
broad no-strike clause, but prohibit strikes only under certain conditions,
e.g., until the grievance procedure has been followed and exhausted, this
limitation on employer discipline is often a real one. 4 Similarly, if the
33 Lab. Arb. 194 (1959) (Edwin R. Teple) (discharge of instigators of strike justi-
fied); Borden Chem. Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 325 (1959) (Saul Wallen) (discharge of
union official justified) ; General Elec. Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 28 (1958) (Burton B. Turk-
us) (suspension justified); Wesson Oil & Snowdrift Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 622 (1957)(Peter Mf. Kelliher) (discharge justified) ; International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 28
Lab. Arb. 121 (1956) (A. R. Marshall) (two week suspension without pay too severe
under the circumstances) ; Goodyear Atomic Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 321 (1956) (Paul N.
Lehoczky) (two week lay-off justified) ; Chrysler Corp., 18 Lab. Arb. 379 (1952)
(David A. Wolff) (discharge unduly severe penalty); H. J. Heinz Co., 16 Lab. Arb.
664 (1951) (Paul N. Lehoczky) (discharge of participants justified; discharge of
bystanders too severe) ; Borg-Warner Corp., 4 Lab. Arb. 4 (1945) (Clarence M. Up-
degraff) (non-discriminatory discharge of union officials justified; discharge for minor
part in strike too severe).
80. H. J. Heinz Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 664 (1951) (Paul N. Lehoczky).
81. See, e.g., Eljer Co. Brass Div., 34 Lab Arb. 741 (1960) (Wayne T. Geis-
singer); Pittsburgh Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 598 (1960) (Harry H. Platt); Borden
Chem. Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 325 (1959) (Saul Wallen); Alside, Inc., 33 Lab. Arb. 194(1959) (Edwin R. Teple); H. J. Heinz Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 664 (1951) (Paul N.
Lehoczky).
82. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 598 (1960) (Harry H. Platt).
83. International Harvester Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 302 (1950) (Ralph T. Seward).
84. Stewart, No Strike Clatues in the Federal Courts, 59 Micir. L. REv. 673, 688(1961), states that 48 per cent of the nation's collective bargaining agreements contain
an absolute ban on strikes, while 46 per cent are of a conditional or limited nature.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
employer is found by the arbitrator to have provoked the strike by its
action, the arbitrator may reduce the penalty imposed by the employer in
accordance with his estimation of the employer's responsibility for the
strike.85 And employer conduct following disciplinary action may also
affect the final award of the arbitrator. For example, if the employer
unconditionally agrees to reinstate discharged strikers, perhaps out of eco-
nomic necessity, the agreement to reinstate may be treated by the arbi-
trator as a condonation of the strike and, consequently, as a waiver of the
right to discharge."8 Additional criteria which arbitrators have used to
modify or set aside employer action are: equality of treatment of strikers
depending upon such circumstances as responsibility for and leadership of
the strike ;87 the type, extent and circumstances of the strike;88 union and
company history ;9 and the effect of the discipline on further occurrences
of a similar nature, as well as on union and employee morale, plant har-
mony and future labor-management relations."0
If the contract imposesresponsibility upon union officials to attempt
to terminate strikes in violation of a no-strike clause, instigation or leader-
ship of such a strike by a union official would be adequate reason for
discharge,9 provided that employees not union officials but also respons-
85. Speer Carbon Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 247 (1951) (Jacob J. Blair) (discharge too
severe a penalty where unauthorized management representations deceived employees
and where foreman made no effort to dissuade walkout).
86. United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949).
87. Eljer Co. Brass Div., 34 Lab. Arb. 741 (1960) (Wayne T. Geissinger); Alside,
Inc., 33 Lab. Arb. (1959) (Edwin R. Teple); Borden Chem. Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 325
(1959) (Saul Wallen); Wesson Oil & Snowdrift Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 622 (1957) (Peter
M. Kelliher); H. J. Heinz Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 664 (1951) (Paul N. Lehoczky).
88. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 866 (1960) (Clair V. Duff) (dis-
charge penalty too severe where wildcat strike was first that had occurred in plant,
discharged employees each had 25 years service without prior disciplinary penalties,
tension in plant made strike possible and employees shut down equipment in such a way
as to protect it); Pittsburgh Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 598 (1960) (Harry H. Platt)
(arbitrator considerations in regard to disciplinary treatment: circumstances, serious-
ness, employee record and length of service, plant conditions, character of disciplined
employee's behavior, possibilities of mitigation); Fern Shoe Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 268
(1950) (J. A. C. Grant) (employees did not realize seriousness of their act; penalty
reduced).
89. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., supra note 88; Pittsburgh Steel Co., 34 Lab.
Arb. 598 (1960) (Harry H. Platt).
90. Under an arbitrator, treatment of problems subject to the arbitration clause
is individualistic, directed to the specific problem arising between a specific company
and specific union, each having their own unique problems. The following is a good
statement regarding discipline: "The modern approach of employers is individualistic
and clinical in method. . . . [Ulnderlying causes for employee misbehavior are carefully
investigated and efforts made to fit penalties both to the offense and to the individual
employee." Pittsburgh Steel Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 601 (1960) (Harry H. Platt).
91. Borden Chem. Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 325 (1959) (Saul Wallen); Wesson Oil &
Snowdrift Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 622 (1957) (Peter M. Kelliher) ; American Brake Shoe
Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 295 (1949) (John Day Larkin).
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ible for leadership or institgation of the strike are punished in the same
manner. 2 To accord different treatment to the union officials might
be discriminatory and therefore productive of an unfair labor prac-
tice charge.93
Subcontracting
At first glance, subcontracting work which would otherwise not be
performed because of a union strike in violation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement is an attractive "remedy" for a struck employer. The em-
ployer by subcontracting might be more readily enabled to meet its busi-
ness obligations, particularly if the time of performance is critical and it
does not appear likely that the strike will terminate before substantially
interfering with its obligations. Thus, the "remedy" of subcontracting
is a form of self-help which can produce results that before Sinclair were
assured only by the injunction--i.e., a steady flow of goods available for
the employer's customers-a result which quite obviously does not flow
from the remedies of rescission, damages and discharge and other
discipline.
In order to examine subcontracting as a form of employer self-help
against a union's breach of a no-strike clause, the permissibility of sub-
contracting under other circumstances must be considered first. The
question of when an employer may subcontract work is currently in a
state of flux and confusion, and the disorder is heightened by the fact
that one answer may result when the Board considers the question to de-
termine if there has been an unfair labor practice, and another when a
court considers the permissibility of subcontracting, outside of the con-
text of unfair labor practices.
When the collective bargaining agreement contains no arbitration
clause several courts have found that subcontracting is solely a manage-
ment prerogative,"4 whether or not the agreement contains a management
prerogative clause," unless there is language in the contract which says
or implies otherwise.9 6  However, when the contract contains an arbitra-
92. Alside, Inc., 33 Lab. Arb. 194 (1959) (Edwin R. Teple); John Deere Ot-
tumbra Works, 11 Lab. Arb. 675 (1948) (Clarence M. Updegraff); Borg-Warner
Corp., 4 Lab. Arb. 4 (1945) (Clarence M. Updegraff).
93. See, 49 Stat. 452, § 8 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958).
94. Local 391, UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962); Amal-
gamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v. Greyhound Corp., 231 F.2d 585 (5th Cir.
1956); Local 600, UAW v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
95. Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v. Greyhound Corp., supra
note 94.
96. In Local 391, UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962), the
court held that the presence of a union shop provision implies that management has
forfeited the right to make unilateral decisions to subcontract.
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tion clause, subcontracting will be held to be an arbitrable matter unless
there is specific language in the agreement which indicates that the parties
did not intend to submit that matter to arbitration.
97
When the contract contains no arbitration clause and no express or
implied restrictions on management's right to subcontract," there is no
reason why the employer should not be able to exercise this right when
the union strikes in violation of the contract. Breach of a no-strike clause
would have no significance in such situations. But, if the employer's
right to subcontract is subject to arbitration, it might be argued that the
union's violation of a collective bargaining agreement by breach of a no-
strike clause would be sufficient to excuse the employer from arbitrating.
Unfortunately, no categorical answer can be given to that proposition,
for as had been seen the Supreme Court has held that a strike violating
a no-strike clause is not per se a sufficient breach or repudiation of the
arbitration clause to excuse the employer from arbitrating,"9 and the
court has not clearly delineated what circumstances attending a union's
breach of a no-strike clause would relieve an employer of its duty to
arbitrate. Undoubtedly each decision would in large measure depend
upon the terms of the arbitration clause itself, i.e., whether the clause was
framed in broad and comprehensive language or was narrowly drawn,'
97. This result follows from the Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), which held that subcontracting
was arbitrable even though the contract included a management prerogative clause and
was otherwise silent as to subcontracting. The lower courts have followed this decision
faithfully, even though some have indicated their disagreement. See, e.g., Independent
Petroleum Workers of America v. American Oil Co., 215 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ind. 1963);
United Cement Workers Int'l v. Celotex Corp., 205 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
For an extensive discussion of subcontracting and arbitration see Goshko, Subcontract-
ing: The Labor Management Relations Act and the Warrior Doctrine: A Lateral
Analysis, 41 U. DEr. L.J. 1 (1963).
98. That is, in courts which recognize such a right. See note 94 supra.
99. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 255, 261-62
(1962): "We do not decide in this case that in no circumstances would a strike in
violation of the no-strike clause . . . entitle the employer to rescind or abandon the
entire contract or to declare its promise to arbitrate forever discharged or to refuse to
arbitrate its damage claims against the union." This amounts to saying that the agree-
ment to arbitrate is not a quid pro quo for the union's promise not to strike:
[We have not enuiciated] . . . a flat and general rule that these two clauses
are properly to be regarded as exact counterweights in every industrial setting,
or to justify either party to the contract in wrenching them from their context
in the collective agreement on the ground that they are mutually dependent
convenants which are severable from the other promises between the parties.
Id. at 261, n.7.
The failure of performance of the one, therefore, does not justify non-performance of
the other. See also Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 299 F.2d 882
(3rd Cir. 1962), and note 49 supra.
100. The following cases held the arbitration clause so broad as to compel arbi-
tration in the face of the union's violation of the no-strike clause: Drake Bakeries,
Inc. v. American Bakery Workers, supra note 99 (all complaints, disputes or griev-
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but the party's prior construction of that clause'0 ' and perhaps even the
severity of the strike might be additional factors.0 2
However, when considering the same contractual terms, the Board
may find that the employer has no right to subcontract. This is because,
under the NLRA, an employer has a statutory duty to bargain collec-
tively during the term of the agreement. 3 Presently the duty imposed
by section 8(a) (5) extends to subcontracting, unless otherwise pro-
vided in the collective bargaining agreement, for the NLRB has recently
held that subcontracting by the employer is a mandatory subject for bar-
gaining. °  It has also been determined, however, that an employer is
excused from the duty to bargain collectively while employees are breach-
ing a no-strike clause in the labor contract.' Consequently, if the union
ances involving questions of interpretation or application of any clause or matter cover-
ed by the contract) ; Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note
99 (any difference between the company and an employee or group of employees in-
volving the interpretation or application of the provisions of the agreement) ; Signal-
Stat. Corp. v. Local 475, United Electric Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1959) (all
disputes, grievances or differences that may arise between the parties). Contra, United
Electric Workers v. Miller Metal Products, 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Markel
Elec. Prod. Inc. v. United Electric Workers, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1953); United
Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948);
Square D Co. v. United Electric Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
The following cases reached a contrary result because of the narrow arbitration
clauses involved: International Union, UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Industries,
242 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1957) (employee grievances) ; Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper
Handlers' Union, 235 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1956) (employee grievances).
For breach of a no-strike clause as a "default" within section 3 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, see Annot., 8 L. Ed.2d 1013, 1016 (1963).
101. In Drake Bakeries, the court found that a mere four months preceding suit
the employers had submitted to arbitration another claim for damages through the
union's breach of contract by strike. The court viewed as one factor in its decision the
employer's conduct indicating his belief that the "matter of a union led strike was a
dispute to be arbitrated under the provisions of the contract." 370 U.S. at 260.
102. That this might be a factor was hinted in Drake Bakeries where the court
was seemingly impressed both by the fact that only a "one-day strike" was involved and
that the union denied "that there was any strike or any breach of contract at all."
Id. at 266.
103. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958). See also Cox & Dunlop,
The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Terin of an Existing Agreement, 63
HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1100-01 (1950).
104. Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), af-f'd on other
grounds, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). The validity of this doctrine is presently at
issue before the Supreme Court. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d
411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 84 Sup. Ct 490 (1964).
105. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (strike in violation of con-
tract not protected activity) ; United Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C.
Cir. 1955); United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949) (unilateral wage increases
during strike violating contract not an unfair labor practice); Dorsey Trailers, Inc.,
80 N.L.R.B. 478 (1948); Charles E. Reed & Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 548 (1948); Joseph
Dyson & Sons, 72 N.L.R.B. 445 (1946). See also Cox & Dunlop, supra note 103, at
1105-07.
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was responsible for a strike in violation of a no-strike clause, the em-
ployer would not be required by the NLRA to bargain collectively con-
cerning his decision to subcontract, at least so long as the strike lasts.
This limitation is important because if subcontracting was held to be a
violation of the duty to bargain in a particular case, the act of subcon-
tracting would convert the strike from an unprotected "economic" strike
into an unfair labor practice strike, and the employer's right to discharge
or discipline would be altered. Although persons who strike in violation
of contract are ordinarily subject to discharge, the Board has held that
a striker must be reinstated, even though he is in breach of contract, if
the strike is or becomes a response to an employer's "serious" unfair labor
practice.' Thus, the question in each particular case would become
whether or not subcontracting was a serious enough unfair labor practice
to warrant an order of reinstatement.
Another problem in regard to subcontracting arises from the fact
that some strikes in violation of contract are "wildcat" strikes, that is,
they are not instigated, supported or sanctioned by the union. If the
union is not responsible for the strike, the employer's duty to bargain
over subcontracting remains in full force. Of course the union will not
be overly receptive to any employer proposal which would vitiate the ef-
fectiveness of its members' strike, and hence, in such cases, the employer's
right to subcontract for all practical purposes is illusory until a bargain-
ing impasse has been reached.' But even then the remedy could be in-
effective. If both parties have bargained in good faith over the em-
ployer's subcontracting proposal, enough time may have passed to have
resulted in the very injury to the employer's business that the subcontract
was designed to avert. Furthermore, for the subcontract to be of any
value, it may be necessary for it to encompass the work of the entire
unit. If less than all the unit employees are participating in the wildcat
strike, the non-striking unit employees will have to be either relocated in
106. The severity of the unfair labor practice may depend upon the type of no-
strike clause in the contract. In Mastro Plastics Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953) aff'd
on other grounds sub norm., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) the
Board held that the employer's unfair labor practice was so serious that the striking
employees were protected from discharge. In Mid-West Metallic Products, Inc., 121
N.L.R.B. 1317 (1958) (no-strike clause which barred strikes only until grievance pro-
cedures had been exhausted), the Board found that the employer who had discharged
employees who struck over an employer unfair labor practice had not violated the act.
The Board distinguished Mastro by saying that since there the no-strike clause was
absolute, the very existence of the union was threatened by the employer unfair labor
practice as the union could never strike and be protected by the act.
107. This is true because it has been held that an employer may not take unilateral
action in regard to a matter which is a mandatory subject for bargaining and is being
negotiated at the time, unless a genuine bargaining impasse has been reached. NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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the plant or laid off; and it is very likely that if there is an arbitration
clause in the contract the employer may not do either without being sub-
ject to an arbitrator's later determination of the appropriateness of his
actions. In such a case even the absence of an arbitration clause does not
alleviate the employer's problems, for the act of relocating or laying off
the non-strikers in the particular unit may well cause considerable dis-
satisfaction among the other employees, and perhaps even encourage them
to join the strike force.
A final, practical limitation on the use of subcontracting in situations
where a strike in breach of contract is involved, is the possibility that the
union may lawfully strike the subcontractor as the employer's "economic
ally." If an employer subcontracts work during a strike merely as a
strike-breaking technique-as though it was in actuality hiring replace-
ments-the striking union will not be prohibited by the secondary boy-
cott provisions of Taft-Hartley's section 8(b) (4)... from carrying its
dispute to the subcontracting employer, or from inducing its employees
to engage in a sympathetic strike."0 9 Obviously, if the union strike re-
sults either in a sympathy walk out by the subcontractor's employees, or
induces the subcontractor to refuse to do the struck work,"' the em-
ployer's "remedy" by subcontracting fails.
It can be safely concluded that unless the employer has expressly
reserved the right to make unilateral decisions to subcontract in the col-
lective bargaining agreement, subcontracting as a form of self-help
against strikes in breach of contract may be more illusory than real.
III. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most striking fact that emerges from a collection and
delineation of an employer's remedies for breach of a no-strike clause is
that there are few "settled" propositions. This lack of adequate guide-
lines for the employer and union is in large measure due to two factors.
First and foremost is the scarcity of court and arbitrator decisions which
deal with remedies other than the injunction. This fact is at least par-
tially attributable to the feeling which prevailed among employers prior
to Sinclair that the injunction was their most effective remedy, and thus
10S. 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV, 1963).
109. NLRB v. Business Machine Mechanics, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956); Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F.
Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See also, General Metals Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1227 (1958) ;
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1958), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4)
(Supp. IV, 1959).
110. It is here assumed that the subcontractor's refusal would in no way violate
the "hot cargo" provisions of the Act. § 704(b) 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(e) (Supp. IV, 1959).
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for the most part, was the only remedy sought. The second factor, which
is now of paramount importance, is that the arbitration process permeates
all of the available employer remedies. As has been shown, the legal ef-
fect of an arbitration clause in the contexts relevant to employer remedies
for breach of a no-strike clause has not yet been thoroughly considered
by the courts. 1 '
Until the unanswered questions concerning the effect of an agree-
ment to arbitrate in the contexts mentioned in this note are finally set-
tled, much of the uncertainty will remain. For the present, employers
will have to place a great deal of reliance on a small amount of precedent
of uncertain value in formulating their responses to union breaches of the
no-strike clause; and unions will not be able to utilize this particular eco-
nomic weapon with much foreknowledge of its consequences. Ultimately
it is to be hoped that the uncertainties will be resolved by union and
management themselves in the form of effectively enforceable promises
not to strike, perhaps through allowing arbitrator injunctions within the
framework of the court and arbitrator decisions which are sure to come.
111. For example, the vital question of the effect of a union's breach of the no-
strike clause upon the employer's duty to arbitrate has not been fully determined. See
notes 49, 99 and 100 supra.
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